
Russia May Tighten Its Policy Towards The CIS Countries

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Parrying the aggression of Georgia against South Ossetia has demonstrated this

This is understandable because Saakashvili and Yushchenko being supporters of Washington have become allies in the anti-Russian attitude a long time ago. But why have Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and other closest allies of Russia kept silent? Attempts to answer this question enable us to say that Russia is to blame for such a stance because of many reasons. Moscow makes too many concessions and courtesies towards its allies.

But what we are to do?

First, with regard to some unfriendly opponents of Russia, we need to continue a harsh policy. Taking into account the explosive situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and a possibility of unleashing of a new large-scale war there, we think that it is necessary to tighten sanctions of Russia against Georgia. Russia has the right to demand this from its CSTO allies (exactly, to demand this!). This is not an arbitrary action but an element of harsh policy. Russia has a right to, having obtained support of the UN, to undertake a course at demilitarization of Georgia. For example, it can organize its maritime and aerial blockade and to implement examination of ships arriving to its ports via the Black Sea from the standpoint of transportation of armament and ammunition.

Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, who had been the director of the main department of international military cooperation in the Defense Ministry for a long time, announced that Russia stopped combat operations against Georgia too early and agreed with a dialogue with intermediaries from the European Union.

Ivashov said, "the victory over Georgia was given to Sarkozy who already changed the paragraphs of the conflict regulation, which would definitely have the most negative impact on the geopolitical interests of Russia in Georgia and in entire South Caucasus in the future." According to Ivashov, having characterized Georgia as an aggressor country that allowed genocide of Ossetians and Russians the Russian authorities had not to enforce peace on Georgia but to achieve its capitulation as had happened to fascist Germany in the past.

Ivashov says, "for the purpose of prevention of new aggression, it would be possible to broaden the security zone of South Ossetia by 30-40 kilometers to the south of the country having reached Gori. In Western Georgia it would be possible to take the strategic paths leading to the Black Sea ports of Poti and Batumi under control. However, we have not even managed to impose a paragraph on the complete demilitarization of Georgia on the European Union. This means that we are not protected from new aggressive actions on the part of Georgia."

Second, we need aggressiveness not only on the military and diplomatic level but also on the economic one. Russia has economic leverage to pressure Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. It is necessary to reinforce them. Russia is catastrophically losing many markets on the territory of the CIS but invests petrodollars in the economy of the US and other Western countries. Why cannot we invest them in the economies of the aforementioned countries thus connecting them to our country not only in business but also in policy? Probably then they will become more loyal towards Moscow?

Third, it is necessary to give up the tactic of "stick and carrot" towards the allies of Russia in the post-Soviet space (first of all, in the field of military technological cooperation). It is necessary to tell the CSTO allies: security in exchange for economic concessions in business.

Fourth, it is really high time for Moscow to manifest its will and to fulfill what is written in the foreign policy concept (FPC) with regard to the role of the collective security system in the post-Soviet space. For example, the FPC says that Russia views the CSTO as "a key tool in maintenance of stability and provision of security in the CIS emphasizing adaptation of the CSTO as a multifunctional integration structure to the changing situation and transformation of the organization into the main institution of security provision in the zone of its responsibility." Unfortunately, this has been said at least for ten years. However, the CSTO was passive when the "tulip" revolution happened in Kyrgyzstan. There is also no participation of the CSTO in the peacekeeping activities in the post-Soviet space. Probably that is why NATO ignores contacts with this organization. However, Moscow wants to change the situation in this aspect and this is inspiring.

Henceforth, the plans for improvement of efficiency of the CSTO are formulated in an official Russian document. It is necessary only to make the CSTO such key tool in provision of security on the territory of the CIS like this is written in the FPC.

Fifth, Russia needs to determine its opponents in the CIS in the conceptual aspect. For example, the FPC says that the attitude of Russia to sub-regional formations and other structures without Russian participation in the CIS space is determined "proceeding from evaluation of their real contribution to provision of good neighborly relations and stability, their readiness to really take into account the legal Russian interests and to respect the already existing mechanisms of cooperation like the CIS, CSTO, Eurasian Economic Union and Shanghai Cooperation Organization." It seems that this is written correctly but the aforementioned mechanisms themselves require improvement. This means that in its activities Russia needs to write principles of interaction with these organizations in a more. It seems that this is written correctly but the aforementioned mechanisms themselves require improvement. This means that in its activities Russia needs to outline the principles of interaction with these organizations in a more detailed manner and clearer. We should not be afraid of harshness. If Russia has real allies they will understand this harshness. This means that we need to build a new system of relations and contacts with them.

It is also possible to mention other necessary measures in foreign policy of Russia towards the CIS countries. These measures will be justified if they lead to growth of authority of Russia as the leading country in the CIS.

Source: . The events connected with the conduction of the operation of peace enforcement in the zones of the Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhaz conflicts by Russia have demonstrated not only the increased combat readiness of the Armed Forces of Russia but also the will of our country to defend its geopolitical interests in the South Caucasian region. The main principles of resolving of the conflict situation between Russia and Georgia were determined with mediation of France. It would seem that having used military force Russia achieved what it wanted: the aggressor was ousted from the territory of South Ossetia and measures of humanitarian and political nature for provision of assistance to the suffered population were taken. Meanwhile, if we analyze lessons of these events, we encounter a very sad fact: the allies of Russia in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and in other organizations did not support Russia in a difficult time.

When the Russian troops were parrying the attack of the Georgian aggressor at South Ossetia tete-a-tete, assistance was coming only from the regions of Russia and CIS countries had either incomprehensible silence or ardent zealous condemnation of Moscow, which was demonstrated by the regime of Victor Yushchenko.
